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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5475
This paper examines the policy options for India as it 
seeks to improve living conditions of the poor on a large 
scale and reduce the population in slums. Addressing 
the problem requires first a diagnosis of the market 
at the city level and a recognition that government 
interventions, rather than thwarting the operations of the 
market, should seek to make it operate better. This can 
substantially reduce the subsidies required to assist low 
income households to attain decent living standards. The 
authors show that government programs that directly 
provide housing would cost, in conservative estimates, 
about of 20 to 30 percent of GDP, and cannot solve a 
problem on the scale of India’s. Using two case studies, 
This paper—a product of a collaboration of the Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department, Sustainable 
Development Network and the Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to identify effective approaches for improving living conditions of the poor in cities at a large scale. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at pannez@worldbank.org, duatreb@msn.com, architect.planner@gmail.com, and vidyadhar.phatak09@gmail.com. 
for Mumbai and Ahmedabad, the paper offers a critical 
examination of government policies that shape the real 
estate market and make formal housing unaffordable for 
a large part of the population. It illustrates how simple 
city level market diagnostics can be used to identify 
policy changes and design smaller assistance programs 
that can reach the poor. The linkage between chronic 
infrastructure backlogs and policies makes housing 
unnecessarily expensive. Increasing the carrying capacity 
of cities is essential for gaining acceptance of real estate 
policies suited to Indian cities. The authors propose 
approaches for funding major investments to achieve this. 
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A. Introduction 
 
Two powerful principles have guided urban land management policies in India, at 
least since the 1970s. First, keeping India’s cities livable means discouraging 
people from coming to large cities and distributing growth to rural areas and small 
secondary cities. Second, planning and other regulatory and financial policies 
coupled with rationing of urban services will actually prevent people from moving 
to cities and hence make them more livable. Together, these two principles are part 
of a broader philosophy underlying the thicket of policies commonly referred to as 
the “license raj” that grew up after Independence in India. This contrasts to the 
overall policy approach post reform in 1991, which—very successfully—
unleashed the sources of economic growth and sought to manage economic 
decisions less directly. Here, we argue that, whatever their merits in the past,  
existing urban land management policies that seek to control the urban land market 
tightly are no longer suited to an India which is growing at rates exceeding 8% for 
sustained periods and in which 70% of new employment is generated in its cities. 
These policies have made formal housing expensive and unattainable to a large 
share of the population, reinforced both chronic urban infrastructure shortages city-
wide and squalid, precarious living conditions in urban slums.   
 
The government of India (GoI) is to be applauded for wishing to turn this around-- 
taking on the ambitious and worthwhile task of dramatically improving living 
conditions in India’s cities, with the ultimate goal of Cities without Slums.  
Substantial increases in central budgetary support to major programs that will 
improve slums in Indian cities are in the works.  It is timely to consider the design 
of a major program shift such as this.  In spite of India’s rapid growth, ensuring 
that good housing standards are affordable to all who wish to live in cities will 
probably take a generation, and getting off to the right start with the first major 
central slum program is key.  
 
As we argue below, a housing policy that supports “cities without slums” should 
involve: (1) making the market work better so that market-priced housing is more 
affordable; and (2) subsidies targeted primarily to the substantial share of the urban 
population that will still be too poor to afford socially acceptable minimum shelter 
conditions.  Assistance to all those households, even if targeted carefully, will be 
large in relation to fiscal capacity. This paper proposes an approach designed to 
make the lofty goal of improving living conditions for all of India’s urban poor 
attainable, and maximize the effectiveness of government resources dedicated to 
this effort.   
P a g e  | 3 
 
 
Without government action, slum populations can be expected to grow in urban 
India even in the face of rapid income growth. Table 1 illustrates a variety of 
scenarios for populations under the poverty line in India. These scenarios use the 
population projections from McKinsey (2010) and draw from the range of 
estimates of the elasticity of poverty headcount percentages with respect to 
economic growth. (Murgai and Zagha: 2010). Even with sustained rapid income 
growth, millions in cities are likely to remain poor and be unable to afford access 
to formal housing. This is because the urban population in India is due to grow 
considerably over the next 20 years. Even with rapid income growth, and much 
lower poverty incidence, the numbers of poor people in cities will continue to be 
substantial. Even with the arguably implausibly optimistic scenario of reaching a 
2% poverty incidence in India’s cities, 11 million people will be poor. A more 
likely scenario suggests that twenty years from now, somewhere between 30 and 
40 million people in urban India will be poor, even if the economy performs very 
well over the long term.  
 
Scenarios of # of Poor in Cities             
Elasticity of 
Poverty with 
respect to Income 
Growth 
Income 
Growth pa 
Period 
in Years 
# of Urban 
Poor 2030 M 
Urban 
Poverty  
incidence 
Total 
Urban 
Population  
2030 M 
0.5  8%  20  65  11.1% 590 
1  8%  20  28  4.7% 590 
1  6%  20  43  7.3% 590 
1.2  10%  20  11  1.9% 590 
Table 1: Number of people under the poverty line in urban India under 
different poverty elasticity assumptions Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
This paper outlines a new strategy in four main sections: 
 
1) Shaping the market to ‘right-size’ the need for subsidies. The supply of 
urban real estate markets in India is deeply constrained by misguided or 
outdated government policies. These policies have a dramatic effect on 
prices and the quite unsurprising result is by far the largest slum 
population of any country in the world. India’s vast and growing slums 
are not an inevitable result of fast urban growth or poverty. Vietnam’s 
cities are growing at twice the rate in India, per capita income is roughly 
P a g e  | 4 
 
similar, but the incidence of slums is much smaller. Other once-poor 
Asian countries like Thailand have passed through the early phases of 
their urban transition with far smaller slum populations. Hong Kong 
SAR, China, accommodated one of the most rapid influxes of poor 
migrants in the 1950s and 1960s, while rapidly accommodating them in 
decent housing.  If India wishes to deal with the slum problem on a large 
scale, it must wind down the phalanx of policies that artificially raise the 
price of housing and make the slum problem larger than it need be. The 
first section discusses these distortions and their impacts. 
 
2) Shortcuts to reform through direct housing provision: Can they work? 
The very distortions that restrict supply and inflate the cost of housing 
also give the impression that there are affordable shortcuts to the market 
reforms and targeted subsidies. Ideas like cross subsidizing housing for 
slum dwellers out of the costs of putting up new housing developments 
for the non-poor2   are popular with governments around the world, 
because they have no visible budgetary costs. In India, they are 
particularly attractive because supply is so tightly rationed and housing 
prices so inflated that often developers will accept these implicit taxes 
without complaint. Their costs can easily be passed on to buyers. 
Because slums have grown so rapidly in the face of rising prosperity, 
many have come to believe that a rights-driven approach for national 
standards of decent housing funded by central subsidies can eradicate 
slums.  In this section we show that these ‘solutions’ are both 
prohibitively expensive and even under the most favorable assumptions 
would take a generation to complete the enormous task of housing the 
current slum population. Such programs are likely to shift the 
affordability problem from households to governments. They may offer 
expansive promises, but will fail to deliver. A few lucky or well 
connected beneficiaries will receive a deep subsidy while the majority of 
the target population will be excluded.  
 
 
3) One size does not fit all: Illustration from case studies of Ahmedabad and 
Mumbai. In this section, we examine data on the housing market 
outcomes, prices, sizes and locations of homes, plus specific constraints 
to supply in each city. This analysis demonstrates that an efficient 
                                                 
2 In India, these most commonly take the form of reservations requiring a certain percentage of houses for the poor 
to be built in all new developments (one of the JNNURM reforms) or else provision of regulatory relief against 
provision of homes to low-income groups (TDR schemes).  
P a g e  | 5 
 
approach to subsidizing a minimum shelter3  standard across all Indian 
cities must take into account market conditions specific to each city. We 
demonstrate how this analysis can be used to determine the scope, design 
and cost of government assistance to address the slum problem in a given 
city.   
 
4) Key elements for government slum policy. In conclusion, the findings 
from the first three sections are recapitulated to discuss the key elements 
of a strategy for improving the living conditions for slum dwellers on a 
large scale—and city by city. Figure 1 below recapitulates the key 
elements of such a strategy.
                                                 
3 We refer to shelter here because it includes not only housing but basic services that provide  environmental 
amenities to households such as safe water and clean and safe streets. In India, these services are rationed all over 
the country and are of higher priority for government programs because these are much more problematic and more 
expensive for individuals to provide on their own.  
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Figure 1: Escaping the Low Level Urban Equilibrium: A Market Approach to Improving 
Living Conditions at City Scale
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B. Right­sizing the Need for Subsidies to Slum Dwellers 
The growth of slums is a market response.  
  
Contrary to the conventional view, the existence of slums is not necessarily a sign 
that markets cannot provide housing to low-income households. The existence of 
slums demonstrates that the private informal sector is able to devise housing 
solutions for even the lowest income groups. Governments have an important role 
to play, however, in determining the penalties paid for living in low-cost housing. 
They determine, by setting standards that raise costs, how much low cost housing 
is informal and thus illegal. They determine whether informal low-cost settlements   
get basic services. Governments also decide on which protections they extend 
under the law for acquired property rights and investments in informal structures. 
Likewise government policies shape many the cost drivers of private sector supply 
response,  and thus determine the share of total housing demand that can be met in 
the formal sector, and how much must be met by informal slum settlements.  
 
Why is the share of the informal housing sector increasing in India while urban 
productivity and households’ income have been steadily increasing over the last 20 
years? Regulatory constraints and land supply bottlenecks created by government 
prevent the formal housing market from offering products that low-income groups 
can afford.  Dramatic under-provision of network infrastructure that accommodates 
intensive land use and permits concentration of population where people want and 
need to live considerably compounds the problem.  It reinforces pressures to 
regulate the supply of built space and rations access to basic environmental 
services in informal settlements.  Removing these constraints could enable the 
formal sector to meet a much larger part of the demand of households currently 
living in slums. Government policy can also reduce the vulnerability of those who 
still can only afford to live in informal settlements. 
 
The  appropriate  frame  of  reference  for  policies  to  reduce  the  slum 
problem is the potential supply response across the entire housing stock. 
 
Slums are not static entities. New households move into slums every day. The new 
comers may be new migrants to the city or households who can no longer afford 
formal housing. Some households currently living in slums may be able to leave 
them and move to formal housing. Some slums may be improved to the point that 
when their tenure is formalized, and their standards are similar to formal housing.  
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The formal housing stock is not static either. High income households tend to 
move up the housing scale, moving from older units to newer and more modern 
ones. In doing so, higher income households free up the older housing stock. These 
older units can then be used by middle income groups, who are themselves moving 
up market, freeing dwelling units in less desirable areas. These older units vacated 
by middle income groups are precisely the ones that would allow the more affluent 
slum dwellers to move out of slums and afford older units in the formal market. It 
is also likely that older housing units are better located for access to jobs than units 
in new greenfield developments.  
 
This dynamic illustrates why it is counterproductive to constrain or tax high end 
development to “promote” low cost housing. The effect is likely to be just the 
opposite. Production of new housing for higher income groups at lower costs has a 
positive effect on the entire housing supply. Taxing it implicitly with cross 
subsidies does the opposite. Removing rigidities at any point in urban real estate 
supply chain can improve the availability of low-income housing.  Restricting 
supply pushes higher income groups into the rehabilitation of older homes, which 
could instead have become moderately priced lower quality housing.  This older 
inner city housing stock vacated by higher income groups might constitute a more 
attractive solution than new suburban developments for lower income groups who 
lack the mobility of more affluent households. 
 
 
Removing rigidities that prevent these market responses to shifting demands is an 
important part of affordable housing policy--more important even than direct 
provision of public housing.  In the dynamic economy of India, it is important to 
monitor these movements of households city by city as incomes increase. 
 
Monitoring these flows can then help to gauge the success of market oriented 
policies. For example, in Mumbai, as  will be discussed in more detail later, the 
absolute decline of formal housing and the rapid increase in slum populations over 
ten years of strong income growth should send a blinking red alarm signal that 
supply side policies need to be revamped. 
 
 
How urban policies have constrained the private sector housing supply 
response in India 
 
 
P a g e  | 9 
 
9 
 
Policies that affect urban land use are at the heart of supply constraints. Urban 
agglomeration economies are derived from locating in close proximity to other 
productive activities. One of the most important features of any residence is 
location close to jobs, services and amenities. As such, well located urban built 
space is a valuable factor of production for all urban economic activities and 
workers, and its price will be determined in a fierce competition amongst all 
possible uses. Well located land is necessarily limited in any city. In India, 
government policies further constrain the supply of land and floor space while also 
inflating demand for land by: 
 
1) Reducing the scope for substituting capital (building more stories) for land 
2) Imposing rigid requirements on consumption of land per area of usable built 
space with little regard to its costs in terms of affordability 
3) Raising the costs and time required for expanding land at the urban 
periphery.  
4) Freezing use of prime land for redevelopment regardless of its market value, 
due either to public ownership, pervasive reservations of private lands, tight 
regulations that make existing land use illegal, or ambiguities in land tenure.  
5) Chronically underinvesting in network and connectivity infrastructure that 
permits a manageable and productive increase in urban densities.  
 
Substituting capital for land 
 
The typical solution to scarce and costly urban land is to substitute a cheaper and 
more readily expandable factor, capital, for land by building multiple stories. This 
permits production of more floor space in good locations.  Rules that limit the 
amount of floor space that can be built on a given piece of land reduce the 
availability of well located floor space and bid up the supply price of a given 
amount of floor area provided in cities to meet all demands, including housing.  
This particular regulation is commonly referred to as a maximum floor area ratio 
(FAR)4. Most countries use maximum permissible FARs, but the FARs in large 
Indian cities are small fractions of those used in most other large cities in the 
world, including in other low and middle income countries. The low values for 
FAR in many cities of India are exceptional as can be seen in Figure 2. These low 
FAR in India also vary little with distance from the city center unlike most other 
countries. 
 
                                                 
4 Also referred to as maximum floor space index (FSI). These two are used interchangeably in this paper.  
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Figure 2: FAR variations with distance in Mumbai and other cities in the 
world 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates how reducing FARs can raise the costs of providing living 
space. This example uses land values representing relatively low and higher values 
for large metro cities like Delhi or Mumbai and taking reasonable estimates for the 
costs of basic standard construction and the impacts of building much higher in the 
high FAR case.  It illustrates that low maximum FAR’s can increase costs above 
what the market would choose to supply in areas with higher land costs. This table 
also illustrates the impact of FAR on aggregate demand for land. Employers and 
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households demand a certain amount of space to live and conduct business in the 
city.  When FAR’s are kept low, much more land is required for a given amount of 
office or residential space. High prices will of course compress the demand for 
space, but not completely, so low maximum FARs result both in spread out cities 
and unnecessarily high land prices.  
 
Table 2. Scenarios Comparing Impact of Lower and Higher FAR on Costs at Different Land 
Prices 
Parameters     Units                         
FAR       
         
1.3  
          
4.0  
         
1.3  
          
4.0  
         
1.3  
        
12.0  
          
1.3  
         
12.0  
land price per square foot     INR.  
        
800  
         
800  
    
4,000  
     
4,000  
        
800  
         
800  
      
4,000  
      
4,000  
Impacts                         
land required per square foot 
of built floor space 
  
square 
feet 
      
0.77  
        
0.25  
      
0.77  
        
0.25  
       
0.77  
        
0.08  
        
0.77  
         
0.08  
                             
land cost  per square foot of 
built floor space 
   INR.  
        
615  
         
200  
    
3,077  
     
1,000  
        
615  
            
67  
      
3,077  
          
333  
                             
construction cost per square 
foot     INR. 
        
700  
         
770  
        
700  
         
770  
        
700  
      
1,400  
         
700  
      
1,400  
                             
total cost per square foot of 
built floor space 
   INR. 
    
1,315  
         
970  
    
3,777  
     
1,770  
     
1,315  
      
1,467  
      
3,777  
      
1,733  
                             
Cost increase for built space 
due to lower FAR 
   %  36%    113%    ‐10%     118%   
                             
Construction costs assumed to increase by 10% and 100% respectively for 4 and 12 
FAR . Land costs are hypothetical. 
 
FAR regulations are not alone in forcing high consumption of land and reducing 
scope for substitution of capital for land.  Minimum plot sizes, regulations 
concerning use of elevators, parking, street width, maximum building coverage, 
etc. require high consumption of land per unit of usable built space, and thus 
contribute to the high cost of formal housing. Many of these regulations are 
normative and not based on any economic assessment of the costs (including the 
price of land) they impose on consumers of housing in a given city. In some areas, 
these additional restrictions are such that they prevent a developer from using even 
all the available FAR. The private formal sector could provide more housing for 
low-income groups if these regulations were audited to insure that land use 
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regulations are consistent with purchasing power and urban land costs in different 
areas of the city.  The cost of reserving land for wide streets and parking lots even 
in areas where most residents don’t own cars and walk in their immediate 
neighborhood is much higher in a mega-city like Delhi than a secondary town in a 
backward area. Yet rarely do the regulations, typically established with strong 
guidance from the State, reflect the costs imposed by rigid adherence to norms 
across cities or neighborhoods. (See Annex 1 for some illustrative examples from 
the Ahmedabad by-laws that make it hard to provide market responsive formal 
housing for low-income groups.)  
 
Figures3a and b below illustrate the major impact of these regulations on fast-
growing economically vibrant cities. In Mumbai, regulations have driven down 
permitted maximum FARs over the years, with the final reduction in 1991 
(ironically coinciding with the dismantling of the license raj in other parts of the 
economy) to a 1.33 Maximum Allowable FAR for the entire greater Mumbai. 
Nearly all of the population increase over time has been absorbed in slums even as 
income has increased rapidly. Now 54 percent of the population lives in slums. 
Mumbai has a much higher share of slum population in spite of being better off.  In 
Ahmedabad, over the period where highly restrictive planning and regulatory 
policies were pursued, the percentage of the population living in slums grew. (see 
Box 2). New census information will be very useful to assess the impact of the 
policy changes that were introduced in Ahmedabad in the 2000 plan.   
 
Figures 4a and b illustrate, showing the household income class distribution for 
Mumbai and Ahmedabad.  
 
P a g e  | 13 
 
13 
 
 
Figure3a. Mumbai --Population living in Formal Dwellings and Slums over Time 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Ahmedabad-Population Living in Formal Dwellings and Slums over time 
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Figure 4a. Income Distribution in Ahmedabad  
 
 
Figure 4b. Income Distribution in Mumbai  
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The existing land registration and tenure system freezes land in current 
use,  perpetuates  fuzzy  property  rights  that  impede  investment,  and 
makes  expansion  of  urban  land  use  at  the  periphery  costly  and  time­
consuming.  
 
In India, the transmission of land tenure and changes of land use are subject to 
multiple layers of legislation, some dating from colonial times. Several 
government agencies, from ministries of agriculture to the ministries of finance 
and revenue have to provide an authorization for a simple change from agricultural 
to urban use, even for lots already within the perimeters of municipalities or 
development authorities.  Oftentimes, urban land transactions require time 
consuming coordination between state level authorities in the revenue department 
and local government authorities, whose systems operate on different principles. 
 
Many lots in and around cities are sold and bought in good faith but without 
always following the intricate procedures required by legislation, These lots are 
then tainted with a “fuzzy” or dubious title and any sale or re-development of the 
land will potentially incur high risk and potential law suits or a “stay order”. 
Oftentimes either old laws like the Urban Land Ceilings Act, or restrictive land use 
regulations, now repealed, placed reservations on plots which prevented normal 
legal transactions or made any formal use of the land illegal. These plots were 
sometimes rented or “sold” to unsuspecting buyers who were unaware of the 
restrictions.  Meanwhile the original owners sometimes sought to regularize the 
land use while retaining formal title. This cycle of regulation and creation of “grey 
rights” results in competing claims on these lands. Because of this legal 
uncertainty, many urban lots are de facto frozen, preventing formal development or 
sale transactions. The number of urban lots in Indian cities that are frozen and 
therefore removed from the formal market is not known, but such frozen plots 
impede the intensification of land use that is a normal part of the urbanization 
process.  In some cities lots with problematic tenure may amount to a large 
percentage of the formal land market.  
 
Lots with fuzzy tenure are often located in already urbanized and serviced areas. 
The occupants who bought the land but do not have clear tenure are likely to be 
able to resist eviction, but they are unlikely to invest in valuable improvements. It 
is costly and time consuming to aggregate plots of land in this condition, so 
redevelopment is very difficult. Yet these lots are well located and may benefit 
from access to existing infrastructure networks. But because these lots are frozen 
for formal development, a part of the existing infrastructure cannot be fully used 
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and the municipality or development authority is obliged to develop more land in 
suburban areas.   
 
In addition, even when land and property titles are clear, the high transaction cost 
and time involved in transmitting titles act as supply constraints. High stamp duties 
are not the only transaction costs.  The time and expertise required to transmit titles 
legally might discourage formal transactions for small lots, although these are 
precisely the type of lots that should be readily marketable. They allow for an 
efficient expansion of built space in local areas without requiring major 
infrastructure expansion. Simplifying the procedure for changing land use and 
transmitting title would increase immediately the number of urban lots that could 
be developed and would contribute to alleviating the land and floor space shortages 
in Indian cities. 
 
We illustrate the specific difficulties and types of transactions costs incurred using 
an analysis of land conversion at the urban periphery taken from Ahmedabad.  
 
Conversion of land at the urban periphery. The topography of the surrounding 
countryside does not pose an impediment to the expansion of the city.  However, 
before anyone can legally build there, land surrounding the city that is classified as 
agricultural5 has to be legally converted to urban land.  This is a complex process 
involving a number of physical, cadastral and tenure related transformations. 
Completing each of those steps involves a great deal of time, financial outlays,   
and risks for a developer.  These in turn drive costs which must ultimately be built 
into the price of the final housing product (or commercial or industrial space). 
Interest during construction is one of the most important cost drivers for 
developers. It accounts for about half of total development costs in a typical 
development project in a relatively expeditious regulatory environment. The cost 
burden, direct and indirect, of these procedures can be very substantial. 
 
 Key steps in the entire process, starting from the conversion of agricultural land up 
to sale of housing as well as the different agencies involved are listed in Figure 5 
below.  All new housing provided on the periphery of Ahmedabad must pass 
through these laborious procedures.  The process for redeveloping and intensifying 
land use on existing plots within the city is similar except that steps 4 to 8 are not 
relevant—if the plot has already passed through the agricultural to urban 
conversion process, which is not the case for many plots in the city.   
 
                                                 
5 By agricultural land, we mean land classified as agricultural. This can be the case where or not the land is under 
cultivation.  
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Figure 5: Process for Adding to the  Housing Stock on the Urban Periphery in 
Ahmedabad 
 
Sources: 
1. From unpublished research project undertaken by Environmental Planning 
Collaborative, Ahmedabad, 2009.  For complementary details see Patel Bimal, et alia 
(2009)  
 
High minimum  regulatory  standards not only  raise  the  costs of a  legal 
dwelling and impose heavy costs on low­income groups: they also block a 
potential source of investment in low­cost housing.   
 
Households living in slums are penalized in many ways in addition to living in an 
unsanitary and crowded environment. These penalties include difficulties of access 
to normal urban services ranging from solid waste removal to water supply and 
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sanitation.  However, one of the most important social and economic penalties 
imposed by high standards is the exclusion of slum dwellers’ housing from the 
protection of the law normally accorded through the property rights system. Any 
real estate transaction is illegal in slums. Transactions however are indispensable 
and occur as often in slums as in the formal real estate sector.  Any dispute over 
contracts can be solved only by using force, because contracts passed in the 
informal sector are unenforceable in a normal court of law. Slum dwellers are also 
subject to evictions and loss of all they have invested in their homes and land, and 
may pay regular protection money to avoid this.  Yet, one of the best sources of 
supply of well located low cost  housing is current slum dwellers, who, if they have  
sufficient security of tenure will invest in additional housing space which can be 
sold or rented out to even lower income groups.  Maintaining strict and inflexible 
standards increases vulnerability and thus cuts off this potential supply. This 
situation contrasts sharply with urban China, for example, where the urban villages 
system protects ‘peasant’ landowners who have legal land tenure and who do not 
need to adhere to normal urban building standards. These villages provide an often 
very well located supply of low cost rental housing for the low-income population, 
including migrants.  Measures to facilitate some form of parallel formal housing 
market that permits lower standards in limited areas of a city and provides explicit 
legal protections for owners of this housing should be considered for India’s cities.  
 
Chronic  under­investment  in  primary  infrastructure  and  rapid  transit 
impedes development at densities  reflecting  the economic potential of 
urban land and makes it very difficult to rationalize land use regulations. 
 
Failure to invest sufficiently in urban infrastructure has greatly contributed to the 
current shortage of urban built space and extremely high real estate prices. 
McKinsey (2010) estimate that Indian cities make annual capital investments of $14 
as compared to $116 in Chinese cities. The lack of urban roads and public transport 
contributes to the fragmentation of urban labor markets and substantially reduces 
urban productivity. Poor quality public transportation drives people to live near 
their work, further creating pressure on well-located land. In Indian cities, 
shortages of water and power, drainage, sewers and proper waste disposal facilities 
affect all income groups.  
 
Government’s perceived inability to expand and improve infrastructure networks 
in response to reasonable demands for urban infrastructure is responsible for what 
might be termed a Malthusian view of the carrying capacity of cities. Infrastructure 
is so chronically undersupplied, and responds to little to increases in population 
and economic activity that it is seen as a fixed resource rather than a set of services 
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managed to meet local demand. The unpopularity of land use reform that would 
increase the intensity of land use, whether it is to increase FAR or to redevelop 
obsolete cotton mills, is symptomatic of this view and quite understandable. 
Without very substantial improvements of basic infrastructure services that 
eliminate the chronic shortages that all urban users face, it is more than likely that 
any increase in local density will be perceived as decreasing the availability, 
quality, and reliability of basic services for those already living in cities.  
 
No low-income housing policy with large scale impacts could succeed in India 
without a massive investment to upgrade the quality of city-wide network 
infrastructure, mostly water, power, storm drainage and transportation. It is an 
essential facilitator of all the supply side regulatory changes we have discussed 
above.  After supply side reforms, the private sector may be able to provide new 
low cost housing affordable to many current slum dwellers, but the existing 
infrastructure could still not cope with the increased water and power consumption 
that would be required—just as it cannot meet current consumption requirements. 
Similarly, the TDR programs currently seen as a budget neutral solution for the 
slum problem will place additional stresses on already overstretched infrastructure 
systems in cities. Using the right fiscal instruments, it is possible to intensify land 
use to increase the supply of housing, and provide finance for more and better 
infrastructure.   
 
To build critical local support for more rational land use policies, a dramatic 
revamping of infrastructure systems in major cities is essential. This infrastructure 
transformation would not only make higher densities acceptable, but would have 
strong economic benefits as well, making more agglomeration economies possible 
and economizing on the current high costs imposed by enduring and appalling 
infrastructure gaps. Rather than playing catch up and seeking to fulfill last year’s 
needs, these programs should aim to build for the city of the future reflecting 
plausible projections of population and economic growth. Beyond improving the 
quality of basic services in cities, better transport connectivity is essential for 
making real estate markets work better. Reduced travel times in the city expand the 
land area that is considered desirable for either working or living space. This 
approach would be a dramatic departure from past practice in India. It has been the 
practice in many fast growing East Asian countries like China, Singapore, Hong 
Kong SAR, China and Korea.  
 
Such a program would take a lot more resources than are currently spent in Indian 
cities, but it would not be unaffordable. McKinsey (2010) catalogues a number of 
options for increasing resources for investment in urban infrastructure. India’s 
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cities have large untapped resources of public lands and other land asset related 
instruments at their disposal that could generate funding many multiples of what 
has flowed into India’s cities in the past. These resources could be used to form the 
foundation of a finance package for infrastructure improvements of unprecedented 
scale. A sale of  a mere 13 hectares in Bandra Kurla in 2005 brought revenues 
equivalent to 10 times the MMRDA’s investment budget of that same year and 3.5 
times the value of all municipal bonds floated in all Indian cities in the decade 
following inception of the program. The revenues raised, as astounding as they are, 
did not fully exploit the potential of this land. Sold with an FAR of only 2, had the 
FAR been set at 5 (still low by international standards) the revenues raised could 
have been more than double—tantamount to over 20 years of MMRDA capital 
spending in 2005 (Peterson:2009). Box 1 provides an example of one such 
transaction in Ahmedabad that will help transform the city. 
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Box 1. Monetizing Government Land for Slum Improvements, Provision of High Quality 
Urban Public Space and Basic Infrastructure: the Sabarmati Project in Ahmedabad. 
Civic leaders in Ahmedabad had long dreamt of transforming the riverfront of the Sabarmati into 
a focal point of high quality public space in the city. When the Narmada dam transformed the 
Sabarmati’s flow from seasonal water availability during the monsoon to a continuous flow, it 
became possible to move from dreams to designs and plans.  
The concept was to undertake massive embankment and land reclamation works to create a 
public realm along the river, improve the river’s flood carrying capacity and to  even out and 
protect the very irregular unstable banks that characterized the Sabarmati’s meander through 
Ahmedabad.  Interceptor sewers embedded in the reclaimed land  would  capture untreated 
sewage coming through the storm water drainage lines and divert it to sewage treatment station 
downriver, thus making the environment much cleaner and more agreeable. Another very 
important project component involved relocation of the population living in the slums on the 
riverbanks to basic housing in the vicinity of the river At the end of the project, public 
promenades, parks, informal markets and a wide variety of social amenities would be built on 
both sides of the river and less than a fifth of the land  would be offered for sale for commercial 
and residential development.  
The project cost was substantial, estimated at INR .3.6 billion. (361crores) in 1998 . Not many 
cities have the ability to raise such funding on capital markets or from banks. However, in this 
case, the city used a very innovative financing strategy. The Ahmedabad Municipal 
Corporation(AMC) obtained an agreement from the Government of Gujarat to cede the property 
rights over the reclaimed river bed to them. Once the project was completed, sales of a fraction 
of the reclaimed land were estimated to cover the costs fully and the financing plan included 
loans against estimated land prices to be realized once works are completed at which time loans 
will be paid back. Essentially this financing method used an asset of little value before the 
project that was transformed by the project itself. The key lay in obtaining agreement from the 
State to release their ownership rights to the city. 
Source: Authors    
 
 
Much  government  controlled  urban  land  is  currently  underused.  If 
developed at an intensity commensurate with its market price, such land 
offers an important source of well located urban built space. 
 
In Indian cities, as is the case in many other countries6, the several levels of 
government and parastatal enterprises own large tracts of land, often located in 
central, highly desirable urban areas well connected to existing infrastructure 
networks. Large parts of these government land holdings are often underused or 
even vacant. Because leasing or selling government land is an extremely complex 
                                                 
6  Research conducted for the World Bank’s Urban Growth Management Initiative indicates that publicly owned 
land accounts for more than half of total city territory in 19% of the 120 cities in its sample, and more than one-
quarter of city territory in an additional 19% of cities. Rajack( 2007).   
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business, even very valuable land stays vacant or underdeveloped. This frozen land 
decreases the land supply on the market and contributes to high land and housing 
prices. For instance in Mumbai, Port Authority land represents 9 km2 of prime 
land already served by infrastructure and with potentially 10 km of sea frontage. 
This area represents 12.5 % of the total land area of the island city. Allowing more 
intensive redevelopment of this land, while maintaining space for the use of its 
current owner, could still significantly expand well located built space in the city, 
and reduce demands for land in the distant suburbs and help to avoid costly 
expansion of infrastructure networks. 
 
 
Removing supply and regulatory constraints helps to “right-size” the 
requirement for government subsidies. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates how revising policies that shape the market also reduce the 
need for direct government subsidies to improve living conditions in cities. 
Undoing some of the damage associated with these policies can make formal 
housing affordable to a larger share of the population and make the slum problem 
more manageable.  
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Figure 6: Housing Policy, housing consumption and households’ income   
 
The upper left graph shows the current supply price and affordability of housing by 
income group. The standards that the private sector supplies – formal and informal 
– that are affordable to a given income group are represented by the curve AB. 
These are dependent on regulatory supply constraints and availability of urban 
infrastructure. The limit between the formal and informal sector is established by 
the minimum regulatory standards (C on the vertical axis) for the formal sector. 
The market cannot produce formal housing units below a price dictated by the 
combination of regulatory standards (minimum plot size, apartment size, maximum 
FAR, etc) and market land and construction prices. The informal housing sector, 
not constrained by these standards, produces housing units for the households who 
cannot afford the cheapest unit produced by the formal sector. Policy changes (and 
complementary infrastructure investments) that affect the ability to substitute 
capital for land and make the supply of urban land more responsive can lower the 
cost of producing a given housing standard, thus increasing what every income 
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group can afford. This can be seen in the shift from AB to AF. Selective relaxation 
of rigid standards brings the most basic formal dwelling unit from C to D.  
 
The current household income distribution is represented in the lower left part of 
the graph. No credible housing policy can be designed without knowing the 
number of potential beneficiaries and therefore the total resources that would be 
required. This is why the upper and lower graphs should be considered together. 
The upper part of the graph shows housing consumption, the lower one shows the 
number of households at each consumption level. The removal of supply 
constraints and relaxation of standards increases housing consumption of most 
former slum dwellers and allows the private formal sector to provide housing units 
affordable to them.   
 
However, even after these measures, some very low-income households can only 
afford extremely low housing standards. The government can economize its own 
subsidy resources by concentrating its efforts first on direct provision to this group 
by directing supply subsidies in the form of social services and tertiary 
infrastructure7. We estimate roughly that it would cost about INR 40,000 per slum 
dweller. The unit cost is an order of magnitude less than the costs of the more 
ambitious programs discussed below, and constitutes a major, but manageable 
government program. The number of households that would receive subsidies 
would be only a fraction of the number of households currently living in slums. 
Over time, a number of households will move out of much improved slum 
neighborhoods into the formal sector, although some of them would be replaced by 
new unskilled migrants.  In addition, since part of the supply side measures include 
substantial improvements for infrastructure networks, all income groups in the city 
would benefit.  
 
C. Can Direct Housing Provision Work without Measures to Make the 
Market Work Better? 
 
 
Because the existence of slums has been erroneously thought to be the symptom of 
a private sector market failure, the traditional response of governments has been to 
substitute itself for the market.  First, governments often take on the costly 
proposition of substituting themselves for the private sector by building housing 
directly for the poor, mandating that the private sector do so, or providing private 
builders with subsidies to produce low-income housing. Second, governments also 
seek to stimulate purchasing power of low-income households through privileged 
                                                 
7 Local neighborhood level network extensions/improvements and household connections. 
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access to credit, interest rates subsidies or sometimes direct cash assistance for 
purchasing or renting homes.  In this section we examine the feasibility of some of 
these “direct provision” solutions and their scope for solving the problem.  We 
show that these shortcuts to making the market work better are likely to have very 
limited impacts, and cannot substitute for a strategy that takes on the policy issues 
and on feasible goals.  
 
The 270 square foot housing program for slum dwellers is prohibitively 
expensive. 
 
The government housing policy proposes to provide a formal 270 square foot 
house to all current slum dwellers. McKinsey (2010) evaluates at 25 million the 
total number of urban households in India who cannot afford a minimum house. 
The same report evaluates the average cost of providing such a minimum house in 
Indian cities at about INR 440,000 (US$ 9,700) including land and tertiary 
infrastructure networks. There are a number of reasons to believe that this estimate 
represents a lower bound of the costs involved. Providing access to such a large 
home for all slum dwellers will demand more land and is likely to bid up the price.  
In Mumbai, as we will see below in the detailed case study, the cost  of a unit in a 
location in which current slum dwellers currently choose to live would be about 
three times that figure. With over 6 million slum dwellers in Mumbai alone, this 
could increase this estimated cost of providing housing for all slum dwellers by 
50%.  
 
 
Even using these conservative cost estimates, the total cost of providing these 
minimum standard dwellings for 25 million households would thus be at least of 
1,100,000 Crores INR (US$ 242.5 billion).  This amounts to roughly 20% of 2008-
2009 GDP. Taking into account the higher costs in Mumbai alone, the bill could 
rise to 30% of GDP.  
 
The costs for such a program do not stop with government-provided basic housing. 
The increases in network infrastructure capacity, plus expansion of primary and 
secondary infrastructure networks needed to accommodate the increased 
consumption of all services that would arise from moving from slums to formal 
housing will add a very significant additional cost. These formal dwellings would 
include a kitchen and bath with running water which would increase water 
consumption  from 50 liter per capita per day (lpcd)—the current average for slum 
dwellers to the minimum basic standard of 150 lpcd. The total additional water 
supply capacity to be added—just to support the minimum housing program—
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would be at least 10 million cubic meters per day (assuming an average household 
size of 4 and no leaks in the system).  A similar complement of incremental costs 
would arise both for sewers and electricity. Such a dramatic infrastructure 
expansion is both costly and unrealistic.  
 
As appealing as the promise of a minimum standard home and the implicit backing 
of central government to fund it may be, such a promise has no likelihood of being 
fulfilled. Even if executed over a decade, such a program could cost considerably 
more than the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, and would stretch 
fiscal capacity beyond a plausible ability to pay.  
 
   
Developer incentives cannot solve the slum problem on a large scale. 
 
Because land regulations are extremely tight in India’s major cities, developers 
have been willing to provide some low cost housing as part of a package that also 
allows them to use land more intensively in the form of increased FAR. That is 
fact. The relative success of such transactions in the past has led to the belief that a 
large part of the affordable housing problem can be solved in this way. That is a 
fallacy. 
 
Two types of proposals using developer incentives are commonly suggested for 
housing slum dwellers at low cost.   
1) Imposing a quota on new formal housing projects to oblige the private 
sector to build EWS housing 
2) Using tradeable development rights (TDR) to provide free housing to 
slum dwellers 
 
Both approaches, by loading the costs of social housing onto the production of new 
housing units,  operate by imposing a de facto tax on formal housing over and 
above the current 27 % tax that is already collected by state and central 
government on housing (McKinsey: 2010: 129). There are limitations to using 
such cross subsidies. 
 
First of all, taxing new formal housing on a large scale has the perverse effect of 
making formal housing less affordable. Creating an additional tax on formal 
housing, whether in the form of land quota for EWS or TDR, increases its cost.  
This effect raises the number of households who must meet their needs in the 
informal sector. The share of formal housing in big cities like Mumbai where these 
schemes are particularly popular (see Table 3) has shrunk in the last few years. 
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Attempting further taxation of the formal sector will merely aggravate this trend.   
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Table 3: Mumbai - Changes in population living in slums and formal housing 
between 1991 and 2001 
Even abstracting from this perverse outcome, obliging private developers to 
provide housing for the poor will necessarily offer a limited supply of housing for 
slum dwellers. This is because the yearly flow of formal housing construction is so 
small in relation to the total housing stock. We illustrate with estimates from 
Mumbai where developer acceptance of TDRs has been relatively good.8 
 
In Greater Mumbai , we evaluate the flow of new formal housing at about 27,000 
units a year or about 0.8% of the total housing stock (see Table 3).  This new 
construction is the only source of supply for low cost developer incentive housing. 
Yet in Mumbai slums account for nearly 45 % of the total housing stock— which 
represents 56 times the annual flow of  new formal housing. The flow of formal 
housing is dramatically disproportionate to the resources needed to replace the 
housing stock in slums with incentive based units.  This can be seen using an 
example based on the current TDR program in Mumbai (Table 4).  
 
                                                 
8 In cities like Bangalore these incentives have had less success because other regulations prevent developers from 
benefiting from additional  FAR. Developers will only agree to the incentive units if it is worth something to them.  
Greater Mumbai Population between 1991 and 2001
Population 1991 % of Total 2001 % of Total Growth Rate
Formal 5,749,562 57.9% 5,438,958 45.6% -0.55%
Slums 4,176,329 42.1% 6,475,440 54.3% 4.48%
Total 9,927,882 100.0% 11,916,399 100.0% 1.84%
Household Size
Formal 4.54 4.5
Slums 5.2 5
Total 4.8 4.7
Number of Households
Formal 1,266,423 61.2% 1,220,501 48.5% -0.4% (4,500)                  
Slums 803,140 38.8% 1,295,088 51.5% 4.9% 63,382                 
Total 2,068,309 100.1% 2,515,589 100.0% 2.0% 49,734                 
Hypothesis of Formal Growth and New Supply
Percent of households who can afford new formal housing 25% 628,897               
Upgrading of Housing and New household formation 
amongst these households 3.5% 22,011                 
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Table 4: Could FAR incentives in the form of TDR solve Mumbai’s slum 
problem? 
Numbers Units
A # of Slum Households in 2001 1,295,088 Households
B
Entitlement to a Flat per Govt 
policy 270 Sq ft
C
Total Floor Space Entitlement for 
Those Living in Slums in 2001: 
AXB 349,673,760 Sq ft
D
Floor Space Allowed to be sold on 
the market per space provided to 
slum dwellers: 70-133% 102%
Average % 
allowed
E
Total Floor Space Sold on Free 
Market Needed to Provide Floor 
Space to those Living in Slums: 
DXC 356,667,235 Sq ft
F
Per Cent of Households that can 
Afford a New Formal Unit 25%
G
Total Number of Households in 
Mumbai 2,515,589
H
# of Households that Can Afford 
a New Formal Unit:FXG 628,897
I
Annual New Household 
Formation  3.50%
J
Total Number of New Formal 
Units Demanded per year: IXH 22,011
K
Average New Formal Apartment 
Size 700 Sq ft
L
Annual Floor Space in New 
Formal Apartments with Potential 
to Provide for  Affordable 
Apartments: JXK 15,407,983 Sq Ft
M
Annual Yearly Provision of 
Affordable Apartment Units if 
ALL Units use TDR L/B 57,067 Households
N
Number of Years until all 
Households in Slums Receive a 
TDR Apartment:A/M 23 Years
O
Average Construction Cost Per 
Square Foot 700 INR
P
Average Implicit Tax on New 
Home Purchasers for 
Constructing Extra  Floor Space 480,392
INR  Per 
New Unit
Illustration of TDR Schemes at City Scale: Mumbai
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If all new housing is built using TDRs, it would take 23 years for TDR projects to 
provide apartments for the households currently living in slums in Mumbai.  The 
provision of housing for slum dwellers would come at a cost of roughly 5 lakh 
(500,000) rupees paid by households purchasing new apartments.  Assuming that 
the average floor space of incentive apartments is about 700 square feet, each 
buyer of new apartment on the formal market will have to pay, in addition to the 
cost of its own dwelling,  for the dwelling of 2.5 slum households.  Obviously, a 
number of new apartments will be built without using TDR, and this will further 
lengthen the period over which housing would be provided to today’s slum 
dwellers.  Meanwhile, during these 23 years, the slum population of Mumbai could 
have grown by an additional 3.4 million at today’s rates. Those new slum 
households, more than double the number in Mumbai in 2001, do not receive 
incentive apartments in this scenario.  
 
 
TDR schemes and EWS quotas are appealing because they have no direct 
budgetary implications, but they would be costly for new households entering the 
formal housing market.  Without changes to the market dynamic that is generating 
negative growth in formal households and slum growth at greater than 4% per 
annum, these schemes merely establish a game of catch up that never ends. 
 
TDR schemes have the additional cost of aggravating the funding deficit for basic 
network infrastructure needed to support city growth. Charging an impact fee for 
new developments is one of the most effective and manageable instruments for 
financing infrastructure improvements in growing cities, especially when intensity 
of land use is on the rise. (See American Institute of Planning: 1997) Merely 
trading higher FAR for apartments for slum dwellers without extracting charges for 
the infrastructure that is essential to supporting new developments will aggravate 
the already substantial shortfalls in urban infrastructure. FAR schemes should not 
be an excuse for continuing the unfortunate past practice of urban development on 
the cheap.   Just as the Development Authority business model has done, TDRs 
designed to focus only on provision of low cost housing without recognizing the 
need for additional infrastructure miss an opportunity to use the fiscal potential that 
these transactions offer.     
 
There is also reason to believe that a large number of today’s slum dwellers will 
not stay in the housing offered under developer incentive schemes or public 
programs for a 270 square foot home. As discussed below in the case studies, 
much of the new housing provided in Mumbai that will be the basis for incentive 
schemes is located in the distant suburbs. Public housing programs seeking to 
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economize on costs will tend to locate in these areas too, because land is less 
expensive there. Housing located in such areas imposes commutes to work that are 
too costly for many current slum dwellers. Both our case studies for Mumbai and 
Ahmedabad suggest that slum dwellers locate in slums at least in part because they 
are close to their place of work and are unlikely to stay for long in far flung 
locations.  
 
 
   
Adding demand side subsidies to the mix without supply side measures 
will have limited effects. 
 
When housing supply is very inflexible, as it is in major Indian cities, the impact of  
providing subsidies to improve household purchasing power or offering interest 
rates subsidies for mortgage loans are blunted, as illustrated in Figure 7 . Most of 
the impact of a subsidy directed at improving purchasing power is absorbed in 
higher prices, because supply is not responsive. 
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Figure 7: Impact of housing subsidy on demand and price 
 
 
 
 
The few countries that seem to have significantly improved the housing conditions 
of the poor and decreased the percentage of households living in slums have done 
so by focusing on developing infrastructure to increase effective land supply, 
allowing intensive use of urban land, and in the initial phases, allowing decent, but 
low standard housing for the poor. In parallel, these governments focused also on 
increasing the income of the poor, through heavy investment in general and 
vocational education, in health services and more generally in increasing urban 
P a g e  | 33 
 
33 
 
productivity.  This was the case in large cities of Asia like Hong Kong SAR, 
China, Bangkok and Seoul. All of these cities were able to accommodate a large 
influx of poor migrants for decades while the percentage of slums was decreasing.  
It is only when the supply of housing is quite flexible, as in the case of Chile, that 
targeted demand side subsidies can reduce the residual of very poor households 
who cannot afford a formal home (Bertaud: 2010). 
D. Market  Analysis  and  Its  Consequences  for  Developing  an 
Affordable Housing Policy in Ahmedabad and Mumbai 
 
Figure 6 in section B. sets out a framework for a strategy to make housing more 
affordable and improve living conditions on a large scale in urban India. In this 
section, we sketch out how this strategy could be applied using two city examples: 
Ahmedabad and Mumbai. Aside from illustrating how specific data on real estate 
policies and market outcomes can be used to formulate a strategy, these examples 
demonstrate how important it is to design policy based on each city’s unique real 
estate market conditions. National standards and templates offer blunt edged and 
potentially expensive or redundant tools for resolving the slum problem.  
 
Understanding the level and distribution of household income  
 
The first task in defining a housing policy in a metropolitan area is to understand 
the parameters of the housing affordability problem in the city.  Essentially, this 
involves measuring purchasing power in comparison to prevailing prices.  This 
analysis must start by obtaining the distribution of income among slum dwellers 
and the population living in formal dwellings. The task is not easy because many 
slum dwellers work in the informal sector so their income is difficult to measure 
with accuracy and can be quite variable. However, in India there are many surveys 
on income and consumption of slum dwellers that have been conducted by 
universities and NGOs, so it should be possible for every major city to have a fair 
idea of income distribution within the slum community and how these incomes 
overlap with the rest of the population.  
 
The distribution of income among urban households is indispensable to assessing 
housing policy. The distribution of income evolves constantly and in a different 
way in each city. Earlier, the establishment of the traditional income categories 
such as EWS, LIG, MIG etc. were an attempt to understand housing needs based 
on income. Unfortunately these categories have been used as “norms” to establish 
prospective benefits or even housing “rights” rather than to quantify demand and 
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capacity to pay. We suggest that each city establish and constantly monitor the 
distribution of households’ income in order to ensure its housing policy is 
responsive to changes in demand.  
 
With the data available we have estimated an income distribution profile for 
Mumbai and Ahmedabad9 (Figure 4a and b).  Incomes are shown at INR 2,500 
intervals from 0 to INR 100,000 per month. Each income profile includes 2 graphs, 
an histogram showing the number of households in each income interval (on the 
primary vertical axis on the left) and a cumulative curve showing the percentage  
of total households below a specific income (expressed on the secondary vertical 
axis on the right).    
 
The data shown on Figure 4 shows how useful accurate information on city-wide 
income distribution can be for setting housing policy. The profiles of household 
income in Mumbai and Ahmedabad are markedly different. In Mumbai is a more 
prosperous city (median income is around INR 20,000 per month and average 
income  is 40,000 as compared to a median of 15,000 and a mean of 28,000 in 
Ahmedabad) but Mumbai has a far more substantial slum population.  
 
The shape of the distribution curve may change with time. Some households will 
shift to the right when their incomes increase because of higher productivity, on 
the other hand, an influx of migrants from rural areas may increase the number of 
households in the left part of the graphs. These changes will put pressure on the 
housing stock and will test the elasticity of housing supply as households’ income 
changes. This phenomenon can be observed in Mumbai where higher income 
groups represent a more substantial share of the population.  
 
 
Once income distributions are available, identifying households that would be 
eligible for assistance in any likely supply conditions, i.e. those facing a binding 
demand side constraint is the first step. These households will need direct 
assistance. We can define this group as those currently living in slums who could 
not possibly afford the construction cost (at current market  prices) of a minimum 
one story simple dwelling of say 130 square feet10 with access to water and toilet. 
The problem of the land cost affordability must be treated separately after 
addressing the supply side and regulatory constraints. Very roughly, we calculate 
                                                 
9 Annex 2 provides details of methodology and sources for developing this income distribution data.  
10 This cost represents the price of building a dwelling of decent quality in wood and brick. The cost of a high rise 
apartment meeting formal standards would be much higher per square foot. In any case, such a small home would 
not meet formal standards, but it would provide much improved accommodation for poor slum dwellers.  
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this cost to be INR 465 per square foot or about INR 60,000 for a 130 square foot 
home, which indicates an annual income of INR 24,000. As can be seen from the 
charts 4a and b, this is a small percentage of households in both cities, and a tiny 
fraction of the population living in slums.  
 
 
For this group, it is clear that some sort of subsidy will be necessary. What form 
this subsidy will take should be discussed only when the total number of 
households requiring a subsidy is known. The next step is to determine which 
improvements are most desired by this group and by their neighbors who may be 
affected what measures it would take and how much it will cost to meet those 
needs. Ultimately, this must be compared to subsidies that may be available from 
the centre as well as state and local own resources.  
 
Understanding  factors affecting the supply of housing in Mumbai and 
Ahmedabad 
 
As discussed above in Section B, these factors, especially those determined by 
policies that affect the supply of available land and built space in a city must be 
understood and evaluated critically before embarking on a program to improve 
housing affordability and reduce slums. Detailed case studies on Ahmedabad and 
Mumbai prepared as part of this work and discuss these constraints at length11. 
Section B above also discussed a number of these issues. Box 2 below summarizes 
the history of policy measures taken in both cities over the last few decades.  
 
Clearly Mumbai suffers from a tightly constrained supply of housing which has 
translated into high prices. These high prices have not kept people from moving to 
Mumbai, as was their original intent. Instead, as can be seen in Figure 12 below, 
they have forced the majority of the population to live in substandard and 
sometimes horrific housing conditions. These policies have been tightened over 
time, even as slum populations exploded. As Table 3 above shows, this effect was 
so strong that the population in formal housing actually declined although the city 
continued to grow rapidly.  
 
Ahmedabad followed a restrictive planning policy but reversed course ten years 
ago. This recent more supply oriented policy has permitted the city to grow rapidly 
without an exploding slum population. Nonetheless our case study shows that there 
is room for improvement on the supply side. Some of the important remaining 
issues in Ahmedabad are the legacy of earlier regulations and restrictions. 
                                                 
11 Available from the authors on request.  
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Draconian restrictions on property rights like the Urban Land Ceilings Act drove 
land owners to find semi-legal alternatives to normal market transactions. These 
solutions create an overhang of muddled property rights and conflicting claims that 
need to be resolved in order to unleash the supply of better housing solutions. 
Property disputes prevent redevelopment, improvements and expansion of existing 
units, and they can prevent owners from renting or selling units they no longer 
need for themselves. As such, they constitute an additional impediment to supply 
over and above the regulatory limitations that gave rise to muddled property rights 
in the first place, and they will not disappear automatically with deregulation.  The 
case study proposes constructive approaches to resolving these conflicting claims. 
The Ahmedabad case also underscores the importance of addressing the issue of 
rural to urban land use conversion in a vibrant urban economy. (See Figure 5 
above) The legal framework governing these conversions was put in place by the 
British colonizers when taxing rural land was effectively was the major 
preoccupation. Today’s land management needs are very different. While pressures 
on urban land and built space are significant all over India, they have nonetheless 
been dampened for decades by long periods of relatively slow economic growth. 
Now that India has settled into a high growth path,  more expeditious means of 
expanding urban land use –with due consideration for potential social 
dislocation—are urgently needed.
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Box 2. Evolution of Policy on Urban Land Use Management:  Ahmedabad and 
Mumbai
 
 1965: First Comprehensive  
Development plan for 
Ahmedabad. Sought to limit 
growth with a green belt 
surrounding the city. Defined 
the allowable FARs in the city 
at 1-1.5 . Private plots were 
reserved for public uses; to be 
appropriated using the 
acquisition.   
 Policies continued in the 
subsequent plan sanctioned in 
1976. 
 By the mid 1980s approach had 
proved a failure.  Illegal growth 
at the periphery, FSI and zoning 
regulations   ignored, reserved 
plots were sold for informal 
house building, artificial 
scarcity raised  
 Development Plan for 2001 
changed course.  Over 100 sq. 
kms of land in the periphery 
zoned for new residential 
growth.  FSI limit in the city 
raised.  Appropriation of private 
land for public purposes 
abandoned, replaced by the 
Town Planning Schemes See 
Ballaney and Patel (2009). 50 
percent of reservations not yet 
acquired were de-reserved.  
 2000-2009 Town Planning 
Schemes vigorously pursued by 
AUDA and the AMC, over 200 
sq km developed, vs. 100 sq km 
in the preceding 25 years.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rent Control legislation in 1947 
froze rental rates in Mumbai for 
current occupants and their heirs, 
freezing redevelopment and 
investment in these areas. 
 1964 -1967. Varying FAR limits 
were introduced. Newly reclaimed 
areas – 3.5 and 4.5, older planned 
areas 2.45, inner city unplanned ares 
1.66, relatively new areas 1.33 and 
the expanding suburbs 1.  Prescribed 
FAR less than actual in many areas, 
freezing this stock for 
redevelopment. Plan prescribed 
maximum density of 250 dwelling 
units per hectare at FAR of 1, this 
implies 430 sq foot average dwelling 
unit size. 
 In 1970 Regional Plan proposed 
development of Navi Mumbai across 
the harbour as a new town for 
diverting growth of Mumbai to 
mainland. 
  In 1991, FAR lowered to 1.33 for 
the entire Island City and 1 for the 
Suburbs. Minimum densities required 
in some areas to ensure supply of 
smaller dwelling units.  1995-1999 
TDRs selectively introduced and 
continue as a means of relaxing FAR 
on a case by case basis for slum 
rehabilitation and redevelopment of 
rent controlled buildings. 
 
 Rent Control reformed in 1999 to 
allow 4 percent per annum increase 
and exempted new construction. 
Market response limited so far. 
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Understanding housing characteristics in prevailing market conditions  
 
The next step in making a market assessment is to understand the price and 
location characteristics of the accommodations families actually choose to live in 
and builders choose to supply. This can be measured at many different degrees of 
precision, depending on the final use of the data. For the purposes of this 
illustrative exercise, we surveyed a few dozen households12.  The survey was 
structured around a housing typology based on expert knowledge. Samples were 
not randomly selected. The result of the survey, while not statistically significant, 
provides a snapshot image of the housing stock beyond the formal/ informal 
dichotomy. Any institutions interested in housing affordability should conduct 
such surveys, allocating enough resources to provide statistically significant 
results. Eventually a fully fledged housing census could be completed in each city 
and hedonic price indexes estimated to understand the housing market, but it is 
possible to get valuable insights with methods that are far less demanding.  
  
                                                 
12 Further details on sampling approach and data collection available upon request.  
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Figure 8: Mumbai housing market -Floor consumption and housing price 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
In Figure 8 we have divided the current Mumbai housing market into 3 categories: 
(1) new apartments (apartments currently on sale or sold after 2008), (2) old 
apartments (apartments built before 2008, some of them might be 100 years old) 
and (3) slums. The case studies include a number of data, such as location, size of 
apartment, current resale value, etc. for each housing unit. It should be noted that 
the current market value of older apartments or housing units in slums do not 
necessarily mean that their current occupant can afford to pay this price. Often they 
cannot. This is typical in markets where supply is heavily constrained, as it is the 
case in Mumbai, the value of every dwelling, no matter how modest or even 
insalubrious, is constantly inflated by the very low supply elasticity when demand 
for housing  increases.  
 
The graph shown on Figure 8 shows that in Mumbai: 
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1) No dwelling – formal or informal – can be purchased for less than INR 
300,000. 
2) The range of housing prices in the slum sample varies from INR 300,000 
to 2 million for floor areas varying from 100 to below 200 square feet. 
This is of course the current sale price for such dwellings.  It doesn’t 
necessarily mean that the current occupant could afford this price.  
 
3) At prices comparable to those paid for slum dwellings (INR 300,000 to 2 
million) larger formal apartments can be purchased.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Mumbai Housing market - sale price and distance from 
city center  
Source: Authors’ Calculations.  
 
4) Displaying the cost per square foot for the same Mumbai case studies 
sorted by distance from the city center (Figure 9) shows that indeed the 
formal units that are comparable in prices with units found in slums are 
in far away suburbs at more than 30 km from the city center (defined as 
Churchgate). 
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5) However it is intriguing that across different slums the cost per square 
foot does not vary much with distance. A likely explanation is that the 
people living in Mumbai slums are unable to commute long distances, 
and therefore select to live in areas close to work. These well located 
slums are by now fully built out and limited in supply. Provided the 
slums are located close to high density residential and business areas, 
prices settle at the price the market for such low quality housing can bear.  
This hypothesis is supported by the findings of a recent transport survey 
of Mumbai slums that 67 % of slum dwellers commute less than 3km 
(World Bank 2005). The variations in sale price per square foot in slums 
as observed in Figure 8 are uncorrelated with distance and may reflect 
differences in infrastructure quality. Any full-fledged city assessment 
would have to include data on both these factors, commuting patterns and 
infrastructure quality.  
 
Figure 10: Ahmedabad housing market - Floor consumption and housing 
prices Source: Authors’ Calculations 
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The housing market in Ahmedabad (Figures 10 and 11), as might be expected, 
shows a very different pattern.  
 
1) Prices are much lower overall. The lowest priced unit is 30 times less 
expensive than its equivalent in Mumbai.  A number of informal solutions 
are available around INR100,000, and all informal housing prices are below 
INR 400,000, putting the highest priced unit of informal housing at 8 times 
less than the equivalent in Mumbai.  
 
2) There is practically no overlap in price of informal and formal housing.  
Only subsidized EWS housing and units provided by the Housing Board 
overlap with both the prices and floor area of the informal sector.  This lack 
of overlap is due to the relatively lower premium paid for well located slums 
and the lower costs of land overall.  
 
 
3) Like Mumbai, in the formal sector the price per square foot is tightly 
correlated with distance from the city center (crossing of Ashram Rd and 
Gandhi Bridge)  while this is not the case for slums. Ahmedabad’s slums are 
relatively small pockets distributed close to the city center. Analysis of 
transport patterns as in the transport survey should be done to confirm the 
preference for short commutes in Ahmedabad’s slums.  
 
4) Unlike Mumbai, Ahmedabad is far less spread out. The furthest distance 
from the city center for formal housing in Mumbai is roughly six times 
higher than in Ahmedabad, for slums, it is three times higher.  
 
5)  There is an overlap between the floor size at the low end of the formal 
market and the high end of the informal market, which is not the case in 
Mumbai. Again, this indicates less pressure to economize on expensive land 
to live in a good location.  
 
6) Figure 11 suggests that in Ahmedabad  an adequate formal alternative for 
slum housing would be priced between INR 1500 and 2000 per square foot 
and would be located not farther than 6 km from the city center. Such a 
formal dwelling could be attainable based on the implicit price of land in 
slum areas today. However, the standards for a formal home should not 
increase the unit size or consumption of land unnecessarily.  
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7) The above result is quite different from the one obtained in Mumbai. This 
demonstrates that imposing norms, price and income ceilings to be applied 
for all of urban India makes little sense for designing a cost effective large-
scale program for slum dwellers.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Ahmedabad housing market - sale price and distance from city 
center Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Using the indications from the market sample for Mumbai and Ahmedabad, we can 
return to making a rough estimate the size of the population that would need a 
minimum subsidy for a 130 square foot home.  
 
Assume that an improved slum dwelling (a reasonable quality building, but not 
multi-story) would be provided.  If the construction cost is INR. 465 per square 
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foot, then the minimum household income level to afford construction costs alone 
is about INR 2100 and using the residual cost of land based on the market 
assessment data for Ahmedabad (see figure 10) this figure increases to  2500 per 
month13. This figure is roughly 90% of the All India urban poverty line 
(Himanshu:2009). For Ahmedabad, our income distribution data suggest this target 
population would amount to about 10% of the total.  Performing a similar 
calculation for Mumbai, based on derived cost of land for Dharavi14, the required 
income per month is roughly 10 times the figure for Ahmedabad, or about INR 
26,000.  Although incomes in Mumbai are higher than in Ahmedabad, nonetheless 
80% of the population is below this required income level.  This simple exercise 
shows the dramatic difference that real estate market conditions can make for the 
size of even a minimalist slum program15. They also show that without supply side 
and regulatory measures in many cities, addressing basic needs can rapidly become 
an unmanageable problem.   
  
Now we turn to a rough characterization of the housing market equilibrium using 
the income distribution and housing price indications developed above. Figure 12 
illustrates the housing market equilibrium in Mumbai. Using house price 
indications, affordability estimates based on the income distribution data, and 
estimates of the stock of various types of housing in our typology, this figure 
shows how different income classes are distributed into various types of 
accommodation in Mumbai.  Much of the middle class and all of the poor are 
forced into substandard housing because of the high price of land and the highly 
inadequate supply of housing.  Most households are living in slums and chawls16. 
The number of such dwelling units can only grow through subdivision of the 
existing floor space or densification by adding additional floors. This illustrates the 
difficulties created by freezing so much of the housing stock for redevelopment 
through reservations or rent controls.  (See box 1 above) Most of the scope for 
                                                 
13 Residual land value is calculated by taking market price per square foot of housing space, subtracting cost of 
construction, then calculating land value using the assumption that land area would 16% more than the surface area. 
These calculations are illustrative only and would have to be redone based on field surveys in the city. We also 
assume that a household could afford a home 2.4 times its income. Again, such figures should be validated with 
field measurements when actually used for establishing the program in a city.  
14 Dharavi is well located , but is still one of the cheapest housing solutions per sq foot. Figures 8-9 illustrate that it 
is necessary to move more than 50km from the city centre to achieve such a low price. It is quite unrealistic to 
expect that many poor households will accept to stay at these long distances from their work—even if they are 
provided with a home there.   
15 These calculations should not be interpreted as a costing of a minimalist program of housing improvement. Such a 
costing would need to include, among others,  infrastructure upgrading, both tertiary improvements for individual 
households and secondary and primary network upgrades to ensure the capacity of the system can handle the 
expansion of new connections.  
16 Chawls are low standard housing once provided to factory workers by their employers. They do not meet current 
standards for formal housing.  
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housing stock expansion now is in the distant suburbs, which are unattractive to 
lower income groups because of the long commute.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Mumbai Household Income and Housing Typology 
Figures 8 and 9 showed that the higher income groups living in slums or chawls 
could afford one or two room apartments in the formal sector, provided these 
apartments were available in already urbanized areas and not in the distant suburbs.  
But for this shift to happen it would require a large new supply of higher income 
group housing.  The stock of such housing is relatively small now, and it would 
require a dramatic increase in this stock of new housing to allow a minimum 
movement of the current slum population into better quality housing. It is also 
quite likely that a number of older well-located units are tied up in regulatory 
snarls or property disputes and unlikely to be vacated. This figure also shows that 
publicly provided housing (MIG HIG, EWS LIG, and slum rehab units) is an 
insignificant share of the overall supply. (less than 10 percent) and formal housing 
conforming with today’s standards represents well less than half of the housing 
stock. Only the top 30 percent of households can afford formal sector housing that 
is compliant with today’s standards  
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
25
00
50
00
75
00
10
00
0
12
50
0
15
00
0
17
50
0
20
00
0
22
50
0
25
00
0
27
50
0
30
00
0
32
50
0
35
00
0
37
50
0
40
00
0
42
50
0
45
00
0
47
50
0
50
00
0
52
50
0
55
00
0
57
50
0
60
00
0
62
50
0
65
00
0
67
50
0
70
00
0
72
50
0
75
00
0
77
50
0
80
00
0
82
50
0
85
00
0
87
50
0
90
00
0
92
50
0
95
00
0
97
50
0
10
00
00
10
25
00
10
50
00
10
75
00
11
00
00
11
25
00
11
50
00
11
75
00
12
00
00
H
ou
se
eh
ol
ds
  in
 '00
0 (T
ot
al
 ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 4.3
 mi
lli
on
)
Monthly Household Income ‐ INR
Mumbai 
+ 3 BHK
2 ‐ 3 BHK
1 BHK
MIG HIG
EWS LIG
Slum Rehab Units
Chawls
Slums
Pavement Dwellings
P a g e  | 46 
 
46 
 
This figure allows us to understand how the housing market works as a whole and 
shows that this market is not really segmented into rigid discrete categories and 
sub-markets. If the supply of housing in the high income categories, say for 
households with income higher than INR 50,000 a month, is just enough to cater to 
new household formation in this category, then for all intents and purposes, 
existing household stay put and close out the scope for freeing up  older existing 
stock for lower income groups.  If the supply of new housing in the higher income 
category is even less than the new household formation, the higher income 
additional households will buy into the existing less desirable housing stock; this is 
the well known “gentrification” phenomenon.  We would see then a movement of 
households toward the left, higher income households moving into less desirable 
housing and outbidding lesser income households for housing units that they were 
previously able to afford. This is probably what happened in Mumbai between 
1991 and 2001 as shown above in Table 3.  
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Figure 13: Ahmedabad Household Income and Housing Typology 
 
The market equilibrium in Ahmedabad also shows a relatively small share of 
public housing options, slightly above 10 percent of the total stock of housing 
which are affordable mostly for the middle class. The walled city and the chawls17 
provide formal housing solutions for a much more substantial share of lower 
income groups, amounting to 35 percent of total. Formal housing is affordable to 
the top 40 percent of households. Clearly supplies are far less constrained, land 
prices more manageable and affordability less of a problem. Yet, even in fortunate 
Ahmedabad, while less than 5 percent of the population is below the All India 
urban poverty level, a much larger percentage is living in slums. It is also striking 
that in a city where household income has grown so rapidly for the last several 
years18, the stock of compliant formal housing is still quite small.  
 
 
Recommendations for national policy  
 
The case studies of Ahmedabad and Mumbai demonstrate that: 
                                                 
17 This housing would not be compliant with today’s standards but is still considered formal.  
18 Estimated at 12.5 per cent in NCAER (2010) 
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1) A normative approach based on quotas or housing standards developed 
by the Government will not be a relevant guide to action in the diversity 
of real estate market situations prevailing in urban India. 
2) However, a common analytical approach can be developed successfully 
for very different cities, and this analytical methodology and format 
could be usefully disseminated by the  Government to allow cities to 
develop their own policy and apply under a common format and criteria 
to for assistance from the central government  
 
A framework for developing a city housing policy should include (a) short range 
“relief” program for current slum dwellers to make basic improvements in housing 
quality and provide connections to basic services, (b) in the medium range 
progressive removal of supply constraints, including a massive investment in 
primary infrastructure and transport, and (c) measures to facilitate private provision 
of a flow of formal units affordable for current slum dwellers’ income range. 
Elements of a new affordable housing strategy for India 
 
Such a policy would have four components:  
 
1. Improve rapidly the environmental conditions in slum areas that represent 
often around 50% of the current housing stock: slum upgrading to ensure 
basic service delivery, legalize real estate trading and construction in slums 
while creating some brakes to the process of wholesale purchase and 
redevelopment of well-located slum areas.  
 
2. Unlock land supply for all 
a) Massive investment in urban infrastructure—water and sanitation, 
solid waste management, electricity, and transportation infrastructure 
serving all income classes.  
b) Remove regulatory constraints that force households and business to 
use more land than they would otherwise. This includes both tight 
floor space index constraints and high standards for formal housing 
that make even poor households purchase more land than they need, 
eg for parking for cars they do not own.  
c) Remove barriers to titling and conversion of rural to urban land 
d) Clarify property rights on frozen lands. Provide a path to legality of 
existing slum areas to unleash owner investments and permit 
redevelopment of these lands if the owners should wish to sell  
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3. Establish taxes or/and impact fees on new development combined with a 
program to lease or sell well located public lands to finance a dramatic 
expansion of  basic urban infrastructure to expand the carrying capacity of 
the city. 
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Annex 1. 
Measures in the General development control regulations of Ahmedabad that increase costs for low-income households 
 
10. DEVELOPMENT OF LAND  
Regulation 
n° 
Page  Description  Comments 
10.1.1  41  Amalgamation and/or subdivision of building unit  Necessity of having the “building unit(s)” approval by 
the competent authority makes the process  more 
complex and may postpone the whole project 
 
10.4  42  Width of road for Amalgamation/subdivision of building unit 
(10.1.1) and for internal building layout in building unit (10.2)  
Width could be noticeably decreased in several cases (mainly 
“residential purpose”): it would consume less space and would 
decrease the infrastructure cost  
10.6  44  Common plot (10% of the building unit) shall be provided for a 
building unit of 2000 sq.mts or more 
It consumes land plots that could be used for 
residential/commercial purposes. Ask the community if it would 
accept less common space 
10.8  45  In any case, building length < 150mts  
If building length > 50mts, through passages 7.50*6.00 are 
required every 30mts 
Demand for so many passages consumes space (it is not 
required in other countries such as France) 
 
11. SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR EXISTING OLD WALLED CITY AND GAMTAL AREA 
 
 
 
12. DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR OTHER THAN GAMTAL AND WALLED CITY AREA 
 
Regulation 
n° 
Page  Description  Comments 
12.1.A (B)  50  Road width (compared with uses not permitted)  Road width seems often too high and consumes more land 
12.2(a)  50  Minimum area of a building unit  Concerning road width, same as above 
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12.3.1  51  Maximum permissible FSI (depending on zones): 0.30<FSI<2.25 Maintaining a low and almost uniform FSI consumes more land, 
increases land cost, travel requirement and infrastructure 
expenditures    
12.3.2  51  Maximum permissible height shall be 40mts   
12.4.1  
(more 
generally, 
the whole 
chapter 
12.4) 
52  Margin and minimum built‐up area (minimum margin size)  Margins seem unnecessarily large and consume land 
       
 
13. COMPOUND WALLS AND GATES 
14. DISTANCE FROM WATER COURSE 
 
 
 
15. DEVELOPMENT OF LOW COST HOUSING 
-> Only for schemes undertaken by public agencies, co-operative societies, Government or semi-government bodies, registered 
developers 
Regulation 
n° 
Page  Description  Comments 
15.1.(i)  59  The maximum permissible density in dwelling = 225 dwellings 
per hectare 
Given other regulations limiting densities, what is rationale? 
15.1.5. 
(ii)…(vi) 
59  Plot size < 40 sq.mts 
Built‐up area < 70% of the plot area 
Minimum frontage of plot = 3mts in width 
Maximum numbers of stories shall be ground plus one upper 
storey only 
10% of the plot area shall be provided for open/community 
space 
See above 
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15.2 (2)  59  Maximum permissible FSI = 1.8
     
 
16. PROVISIONS FOR SPECIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
17. GENERAL BUILDING REQUIREMENTS 
Regulation 
n° 
Page  Description  Comments 
17.1 (i)  65  Lift shall be provided in case of building having height 
more than 13 mts from ground level 
Communities say they would accept 4 floors building without elevators 
17.1 (iii)  65  In case of building with 21 mts or more in height, at least 
two lifts shall be provided 
Same as above 
17.20.8 
17.20.13 
77  Maintaining skyline and architectural harmony  Blanket restriction. Need for such rules depends on the number and 
the location of precincts  (vague)including  
listed heritage buildings.  
 
18. REGULATIONS FOR SPECIAL STRUCTURES (cinema, theater, meeting hall…) 
 
 
19. PARKING 
 
Regulation 
n° 
Page  Description  Comments 
19.1  91  For residential area, parking space required is 15% of maximum 
permissible FSI 
For low‐income residents there a real demand for such a 
parking area which is costly and consumes land? This rule 
combines with height restrictions and requirements for 
elevators to increase demand for land or require higher costs 
for elevators.  
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Annex 2. Ahmedabad and Mumbai: Computation 
of Income Distributions and Allocation of Households 
Across Housing Stocks  
A. Income Distribution 
Data about income distribution in Ahmedabad and Mumbai is reported in the recent 
NCAER publication.19 The income distribution in 2007-8 represented in 2004-5 
prices is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Income Distribution: Ahmedabad and Mumbai 
 
Income Distribution 2007-8, Mean Income in 2004-5 Prices 
  Ahmedabad Mumbai 
Class % of Total 
Households 
Annual Total 
Income of the 
Class INR in 
Million  
% of Total 
Income 
Annual Total 
Income of the 
Class INR in 
Million  
Low Income 13.6 38,906 10.8 213,372 
Aspirants 43.9 125,585 41.1 811,998 
Middle Class 39.8 113,856 41.9 827,804 
High Income 2.7 7,724 6.2 122,491 
Total 100 286,070 100 1,975,665 
   286,070  1,975,665 
Mean Household Annual Income 317,856  459,457 
Households million 0.9   4.3 
Note: Outputs of the Study are shaded   
Source: NCAER (2010)    
 
It may be noted that NCAER has furnished Mean Household Annual Income and 
Number of Households. From this total household income is calculated (Households x 
Mean Income). The total household income of the city is distributed across the four 
income classes according to the shares provided by NCAER. 
B. Distribution  of  Households  according  to  Income 
Classes 
 
NCAER (2010) provides the household income range for each class indicated above 
in USD. These have been converted to INR at an exchange rate of 1USD=INR 46. By 
dividing the total income of the class shown in Table 1 by the estimated household 
income the number of households in each class is arrived at. This is shown in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
19 NCAER (2010) 
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Table 2: Distribution of Households by Income Classes 
 
 
 
It may be clarified that since the mean income in the above table is calculated at the 
top end of the income bracket it is deliberately allowed to be higher than that shown 
in Table 1. This has enabled household income distribution at finer and uniform 
income intervals of INR 2500 to result in final mean income (after some iterations) to 
be in tune with that shown in Table 1.  
C. Distribution of Households in Finer Income Classes 
 
The above household distribution in broad income classes has been translated into 
distribution across finer income classes. The distribution of households in finer 
income classes for the Ahmedabad and Mumbai is depicted in Graphs in the text. 
Although the household distribution has been worked out for income ranging from 
INR 2500 to INR 300,000 the graphs show incomes from INR 2500 to INR 120,000.  
These account for 97% and 95% of the household in Ahmedabad and Mumbai 
respectively. 
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The mean and median incomes indicate the likely variation in the income distribution 
of the two cities. These are given in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Household Income Distribution 
 
City  Mean Income INR per Month Median  Income INR per Month 
Ahmedabad  28000  15000
Mumbai  41000  20000
 
D. Ahmedabad:  Housing Stock by Type 
 
The available housing stock in Ahmedabad is identified as shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Ahmedabad Housing Stock 
 
Sr. 
No. 
House type  Price range INR  Percent of 
Stock 
Nature of Stock 
1  Pavement Dwellers    0.4  Informal 
2  River front slums   10,000 – 200,000  2.0  Informal 
3  Other slums  20,000 – 225,000  25.0  Informal 
4  Chawls  40,000‐ 400,000  21.1
 
Formal but non‐compliant with 
present standards 
5  EWS LIG   180,000 – 500,000  8.1  Public Housing 
6  Walled City  200,000  10.1  Formal but non‐compliant with 
present standards 
7  MIG HIG  
 
1200,000 – 1800,000  3.1  Public Housing 
8  Twin/ Row Houses  900,000 – 60,00,000 
30.2  Formal 9  Apartments   750,000 – 60,00,000 
10  Bungalows  2500,000 – 
100,00,000 
      100.0   
 
Affordability of households apart from income, vary considerably depending upon 
age of the head of household, access to housing finance and availability of the stock. 
For example stock of MIG HIG public house is so small that despite initial low prices 
it quickly adjusts to market in terms of prices and income of the occupants. The 
intended households then have to seek shelter in walled city or distant apartments. For 
household in slums despite increase in income there are no opportunities to seek 
better and formal houses. Taking into account these considerations, total households 
are allocated to available stock according to their purchasing power using standard 
affordability multiples for home purchase—2.5 x annual income. This allocation is 
shown in Figure 13 in the main text. 
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E. Mumbai: Housing Stock by Type 
 
Following methodology similar to that of Ahmedabad Mumbai’s housing stock is 
categorized as shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Mumbai Housing Stock 
 
Sr. 
No. 
House type  Price range INR  Percent of Stock  Nature of Stock 
1  Pavement Dwellers 
300,000 – 23,50,000  3  Informal 
3   Slums  45  Informal 
4  Chawls 
20,00,000 – 40,00,000 
15 
 
Formal but non‐compliant 
with present standards 
5  Slum Rehabilitation  2  Formal initially free to slum 
dwellers 
5  EWS LIG   5  Public Housing 
7  MIG HIG  
10,20,000 – 85,00,000  2  Public Housing 
8  1 BHK Apartments  28 
 
 
Formal 9  2 – 3 BHK Apartments  65,00,000 – 
25,00,00,000 10  + 3 BHK Apartments 
  Total    100   
 
 
Apart from the factors noted in above in case of Ahmedabad, in case Mumbai time 
and cost of travel to work have a strong influence in selecting type of house. 
Moreover pernicious controls on development have severely limited the opportunity 
for improving the shelter for the majority. This illustrated in Figure 12 in the main 
text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
